penetrify.cloud/blog

Blog

Análisis, guías y actualizaciones desde la vanguardia de la seguridad autónoma.

La brecha del evaluador de CVE-Bench: cuando los exploits exitosos puntúan cero
2 de septiembre de 2026

La brecha del evaluador de CVE-Bench: cuando los exploits exitosos puntúan cero

Varios de los evaluadores automáticos de CVE-Bench se bloquean o se cuelgan en el momento en que un exploit altera su objetivo, y un evaluador bloqueado se registra silenciosamente como un ataque fallido. El benchmark puede puntuar un compromiso genuino como un fracaso.

Leer el artículo
SQL Injection Despite the ORM: The One Raw Query Nobody Reviewed
14 de agosto de 2026

SQL Injection Despite the ORM: The One Raw Query Nobody Reviewed

Using an ORM does not prevent SQL injection. It concentrates it: hundreds of safe queries lull the team, and the one raw query someone wrote for a report interpolates a parameter straight into the statement.

Leer el artículo
Indirect Prompt Injection to Data Exfiltration: When the Model Has Tools
14 de agosto de 2026

Indirect Prompt Injection to Data Exfiltration: When the Model Has Tools

Prompt injection on its own is a curiosity. Prompt injection reaching a tool that holds real credentials is a breach — and the instruction does not have to come from your user. It can arrive inside the document your app was asked to summarise.

Leer el artículo
The Unverified Stripe Webhook: Forging checkout.session.completed for Free Premium
14 de agosto de 2026

The Unverified Stripe Webhook: Forging checkout.session.completed for Free Premium

Your webhook endpoint is a public URL that grants entitlements. Without signature verification it accepts a payment confirmation from anyone — and the request that upgrades an attacker to your top tier is a single curl command.

Leer el artículo
When org_id Is a Parameter, Not a Boundary: Multi-Tenant Data Isolation Failure
14 de agosto de 2026

When org_id Is a Parameter, Not a Boundary: Multi-Tenant Data Isolation Failure

Every multi-tenant application has an organisation identifier. The question that decides whether you have isolation is where it comes from — the session, or the request. When it comes from the request, one customer reads another's data with a single edited value.

Leer el artículo
Firebase Security Rules Left Wide Open: allow read, write: if true
14 de agosto de 2026

Firebase Security Rules Left Wide Open: allow read, write: if true

Firebase asks you to choose a rules mode when you create a database, and the permissive option is the one that makes the tutorial work. Months later the app is live, the rule still says if true, and anyone with the project ID can read and write the entire database.

Leer el artículo
The Supabase service_role Key in the Client Bundle: RLS Bypassed Entirely
14 de agosto de 2026

The Supabase service_role Key in the Client Bundle: RLS Bypassed Entirely

Row Level Security is the control that keeps one Supabase user out of another's rows. The service_role key is designed to ignore it. When that key reaches the browser, every policy you wrote stops mattering — and the pattern shows up in production more often than anyone admits.

Leer el artículo
Nuestra propia aplicación guardaba los tokens de autenticación en localStorage. Esto es lo que cambiamos.
28 de julio de 2026

Nuestra propia aplicación guardaba los tokens de autenticación en localStorage. Esto es lo que cambiamos.

Escaneamos nuestra propia aplicación y el informe marcó el login con Cognito. Por qué cifrar no sirve y qué desplegamos en su lugar.

Leer el artículo
What an autonomous pentest agent found in 3,847 apps — and what your scanner didn't
30 de junio de 2026

What an autonomous pentest agent found in 3,847 apps — and what your scanner didn't

A data breakdown of 47,291 exploitation-validated findings, with methodology and limitations. 91% of the SQL injection we found shipped despite a SAST gate in CI; 78% of critical findings needed no login.

Leer el artículo
Anterior1/14Siguiente